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Abstract
In quantum information, the role of entanglement and
disentanglement is itself a subject of research and debate.
Earlier works on quantum cryptography have almost es-
tablished that entanglement has no special advantage in
quantum cryptography. In this paper we reveal that en-
tanglement is better ingredient than disentanglement for
our alternative quantum cryptography.
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In quantum information, there are some tasks which can be accomplished
only by entanglement -such as dense coding [1] and teleportation [2]. But,
there are some other tasks which can be realized both by entanglement
and disentanglement. Quantum computation algorithm [3] and quantum
cryptography [3-5]are two major applications of both entanglement and
disentanglement.
Between entanglement and disentanglement which one is better in-
gredient in quantum computation and quantum cryptography ? This
question is yet not settled in quantum computation, however, entangle-
ment enjoys some favoritism from the researchers in this field. In quan-
tum cryptography this question is believed to have been settled. In his
entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol [5] Ekert pointed
out that quantum encryption can be executed after the transmission of
the quantum state. This seemed to be advantageous to ensure the secu-
rity of the key. Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [6] comparatively stud-
ied Ekert’s entanglement-based and Bennett-Brassard’s disentanglement-
based quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. They concluded that
so far security is concerned, the operational advantage of Ekert’s proto-
col is apparent. Since then, many quantum cryptographic protocols have
been proposed and both type of cryptosystems have been extensively
studied. But neither of the two type of systems can stake claim of its
superiority.
In their comparative study [6], Bennett et al made an another impor-
tant observation. They found that entanglement and disentanglement
based cryptosystem are indistinguishable. That is, which type is being
used cannot be distinguished by others. If sender uses entangled state
but tells dishonestly to the receiver that he used disentangled state for
the encryption, then receiver could not also verify the veracity of sender’s
statement. In that sense, two cryptosystems are indistinguishable. It is
recently understood conventional quantum bit commitment protocol ( a
cryptographic application) completely fails [7,8] because of this indistin-
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guishability of two systems. Therefore, Bennett et al’s work has become
helpful to examine other cryptographic tasks. Their work was based
on conventional cryptography. Recently alternative disentanglement and
entanglement based cryptographic protocols have been proposed [9,10].
Many conclusions drawn from conventional quantum cryptography do
not hold good in alternative quantum cryptography. So a fresh compar-
ative study is necessary.
Alternative disentanglement-based cryptosystem [9] uses mixed quan-
tum state to encode a bit value but alternative entanglement based sys-
tem [10] uses many pure entangled states for the same purpose. Despite
this dissimilarity, they have many similarities. Both can operate entirely
on quantum channel and can provide quantum authentication. In both
the systems, key can carry meaningful information. Secure bit commit-
ment encoding [11]and secure quantum coin tossing [11] are possible for
both the systems.
Yet the two systems are not well understood. We have seen that clas-
sical channel cannot be used in disentanglement-based system when each
individual bit is separately made secure, but we do not know whether
same is true for our entanglement-based system. We also do not know
whether conventional cryptography or its prototype can be recovered
from these alternative systems or not. Here we shall see that on these
two questions two cryptosystems differ.
First, we shall present a modified (alternative) entanglement-based
QKD protocol in which classical channel can be used when each bit is
separately made secure and a prototype of conventional QKD protocol
can be recovered from this protocol. This kind of modification is not
possible for our disentanglement based system. This will imply that
our entanglement-based system can be made much much faster than our
disentanglement-based system.
Suppose a source emits pairs of spin 1/2 particle in their singlet state.
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Two users, Alice and Bob, get one particle from each pair. Alice and Bob
secretly share the information of two sequences of measurements. Sup-
pose two sequences of direction of spin-measurements are:
Sn
0
= {x, x, y, y, x, y, y, y, x, x, y, x, ..............},
Sn
1
= {y, x, x, x, y, y, x, y, y, y, x, x, ..............},
where 0 and 1 in the subscripts stand for bit values and ”x” and ”y” are
two orthogonal directions of measurements.
Let us assume they jointly decide the bit values. The bit values can
be decided when both of them use the same sequence of measurements.
To produce a key, both use S0 and S1 at random on their own sequences
of EPR particles. When both use S0 or S1, the corresponding results
will be perfectly correlated. But if one use S0 and other S1 or vice versa,
the results will not be perfectly correlated. So 50% bit value choices are
discarded. The remaining 50% bits form the key. We shall first assume
they reveal results through classical public channel.
Their measurements yield the two sequences of data sets:
{
RA
1
, RA
2
, RA
3
, RA
4
, RA
5
, RA
6
, RA
7
, RA
8
, ................
}
.{
RB
1
, RB
2
, RB
3
, RB
4
, RB
5
, RB
6
, RB
7
, RB
8
, ................
}
.
The first one is Alice’s sequence and second one is Bob’s. Half of their
data sets contain perfectly correlated data.
Eavesdropper’s problem is to know the secret code of measurements.
For simplicity, let us think they want to produce a single bit and only
Bob’s particles are exposed to Eve. Eve can directly or indirectly mea-
sure using her own sequence of measurements. She gets a set of data
from her measurements and taps Alice’s set of data when Alice reveals
the results. But these two sets of data will neither reveal any bit infor-
mation nor complete information of Alice’s choice of measurements. Now
it is Eve’s turn to reveal the results. Alice’s and Eve’s results cannot be
perfectly correlated. But this can be interpreted by Alice as a case of
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non-identical choice of bit values. Note that in S0 and S1 there is a com-
mon subsequence Sc. So if Alice does not get perfect correlation, she can
check the data corresponding to Sc. Irrespective of choice of sequences
of measurements, the data corresponding to Sc will be always perfectly
correlated. This second test will expose eavesdropping. Still it is not the
last nail to eavesdropping.
The data are not secure because public channel is not authenticated
channel. Eve can impersonate. After Alice’s disclosure of data, Eve,
impersonating Bob, can reveal ”fake data” correlating with Alice’s data.
Same thing she can do with Bob’s data impersonating Alice. Note that
this attack works only for ”fake correlation”. That is, this attack will
work when the users choose the same bit value. But they also choose
different bit values in 50% cases. In those cases, data are not perfectly
correlated, only the data corresponding to Sc are perfectly correlated.
So initially if they do not get perfect correlation between their data sets,
they will get perfect correlation in the subsets. As Sc is hidden in S0 and
S1, Eve could not generate ”fake correlation” in the data corresponding
to the subset Sc. Therefore Eve can only impersonate to select the bits
not to reject the bits. Eve can leave the task of rejecting the bits for the
legitimate users. It seems that system fails.
There is a rescue. The ”fake correlation” attack works as both of
them reveal all the data of the same events. The ”fake correlation” can-
not be produced if they do not reveal any data. But the data has to be
revealed if the system is to run. If they do not reveal all the results of
the same events, yet the system can work but ”fake correlation” attack
cannot. For clarity, suppose they divide the results of each set into two
subsets. Alice’s subsets are rA
1
and rA
2
and Bob’s corresponding subsets
are: rB
1
and rB
2
. They reveal the data of non identical sets -that is, either
rA
1
and rB
2
or rA
2
and rB
1
. Because, the data of two correlated subsets are
not revealed, ”fake correlation” attack will not work.
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To create many bits, the strategy, discussed above, has to be repeat-
edly used to ensure bit by bit security. If any bit is found corrupted, the
next bit will not be produced. If eavesdropping is detected they must
reject S0 and S1 and may try with another two preselected sequences of
measurements.
Is it possible to recover existing quantum cryptography from alter-
native quantum cryptography and vice versa ? Let us see the basic
difference of the conventional and alternative systems. In conventional
quantum cryptography, a pure state or a pure entangled state represent
a classical bit/bits. On the other hand in alternative quantum cryptog-
raphy, many states represent a classical bit. The bits of the conventional
cryptosystem do not carry meaningful information but it carries mean-
ingful information in alternative cryptosystem. Therefore recovery of al-
ternative system from conventional system is not possible. But if we can
produce pure state -bits (which does not carry any meaningful informa-
tion) from alternative system then at least recovery of prototype of con-
ventional system, if not the same system, will be possible. We have two
options - recovery of conventional entanglement-based system from al-
ternative entanglement based system and conventional disentanglement-
based system from alternative disentanglement-based system. Next we
shall see that the former can be easily realized.
We have seen that when both of them use S0 or S1, the data are per-
fectly correlated. These two sets of data can make a key provided they
are not revealed. Suppose Alice divides the results into three subsets rA
1
,
rA
2
and rA
3
. Taking the results of same instances( which events will be
chosen to construct the three subsets are not secret) Bob prepares his
three subsets rB
1
, rB
2
and rB
3
. Alice reveals rA
1
and Bob rB
2
or Alice re-
veals rA
2
and Bob rB
2
. Both go through the correlation test. If correlation
is found they know their chosen bit value and side by side they know
the undisclosed subsets rA
3
and rB
3
contain perfectly correlated data. To
construct r3, it is better to use the data corresponding to Sc so that they
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always get perfectly correlated data even when they use non-identical
sequences of measurements. Continuing the process two different kind of
keys (fast and slow keys) can be produced. The former does not exist
even in the mind of the users and the later can exist in the mind of the
users. If they want to produce only the former type they can share only
a single sequence of measurement instead of the two.
The recovery of conventional entanglement-based system from alter-
native entanglement-based system is not possible. The reason is, a se-
quence of single photon polarized states produces sequence of results.
These results can represent bit value. But if these results are revealed
they cannot be secure.
Why do these systems differ on the above two issues ? From a se-
quence of two-particle entangled state Alice and Bob can get correlated
random bits. And some of the correlated data are used for authentication
via public channel and rest of the correlated data itself can make a fast
key (which is a recovery of a prototype of conventional QKD protocol).
Measurements on a sequence of disentangled states never produce cor-
related data. Therefore, entanglement is a necessary condition to have
the above mentioned two utilities. As we get fast key from entanglement
based system, entanglement is better secure number generator than dis-
entanglement in our case.
Throughout our discussion we relied on bit by bit security. If we do
not want bit by bit security but want security of many bits (meaningful)
at a time, then such security needs to be proved. In that scenario there
may have a possibility of using authenticated classical channel (authenti-
cation by some additional shared classical bits) in our disentanglement-
based system. In that eventuality, we can say the use of classical channel
and bit by bit security are mutually exclusive in our disentanglement-
based system.
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